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exeCutive summAry
In litigation regarding employment discrimination, the burden of establishing proof has continued to shift. As a result, employers and legal counsel need to be aware of the status of what they and human resources professionals should consider when an employee alleges that the employer has violated federal discrimination statutes. The original standard of proof 
required the plaintiff to establish that the employer discriminated against that person. Many cases still 
involve that approach, giving the plaintiff the burden of creating prima facie case. However, another 
line of rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court added an alternative method for addressing discrimination 
litigation, known as the mixed motive approach. The two-prong mixed motive case requires the 
employee to demonstrate that a protected characteristic (e.g., race, sex, national origin) was a substantial 
factor in an employer’s adverse action. If that is established, the employer then has the burden of proving 
that the decision would have been made in any event, regardless of the employee’s protected characteristic. 
As a practical matter, employers facing litigation of this type must consider whether and how to defend 
such a case. Even a “win” can be expensive, because in cases where there is a divided decision, the 
employer must pay the plaintiff ’s attorney fees and court costs, as well as its own. Moreover, since the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 places discrimination cases in front of a jury, a divided decision is seemingly 
more likely. Although that presumably gives both sides a win, it still means a large expense for the 
employer.
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Chr reports
By David Sherwyn, J.D., Steven Carvell, Ph.D., and Joseph 
Baumgarten, J.D.
The Mixed Motive Instruction in 
Employment Discrimination Cases: 
What Employers Need to Know
T
he burden of proof in discrimination cases has been the subject of at least eight Supreme 
Court cases, hundreds of lower courts cases, and thousands of law review pages. Some might 
consider the time spent on this topic to be a prime example of a situation in which the Supreme 
Court, numerous lower court judges, lawyers, and academics are focusing too much energy on a 
relatively meaningless question. The issue is not meaningless to those who have found themselves the 
target of litigation, however. For those parties, the way that courts assign the burden of proof may, in 
fact, determine the probability of a damage award and the amounts of the damages awarded. Thus, a 
change in the allocation of the burden of proof can affect the number of cases filed, the amount of 
settlements agreed upon, and the fate of thousands of cases. 
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In contrast to the view that burden of proof is 
immaterial, we note the holding in Desert Palace d/b/a 
Caesars Palace Hotel & Casino v. Costa. In this opinion, 
the United States Supreme Court set a new standard for 
determining whether plaintiffs can get a “mixed motive” jury 
instruction in discrimination cases. 1 This case represents 
a major shift in the balance of power in discrimination 
lawsuits. In fact, as we explain below, it is possible that 
Costa’s effect will be so great that employers should rarely go 
to trial in discrimination cases because the cost of losing will 
be so high and the odds of winning so low. Knowing this, 
plaintiffs’ lawyers will be apt to take increasingly marginal 
cases and will demand higher settlements. If our analysis is 
correct, Costa will have fundamentally changed the face of 
discrimination cases by transforming marginal cases into 
huge liabilities for employers. 
In this report we analyze the effect of the shifting 
burden of proof, particularly in the wake of Costa. Unfortu-
nately, as we explain below, neither an analysis of published 
legal opinions nor any other traditional method of legal 
research will answer the question. Because the precedent in 
Costa is relatively recent, a survey of lawyers is unlikely to 
answer this question with any certainty. Thus, to analyze the 
effect of Costa, we have developed our own data from a test 
sample. In addition to a discussion of the cases leading up to 
the Costa holding, this Center Report presents the results of 
a study that we conducted to determine the effect of Costa 
on the outcome of discrimination cases. Our discussion 
of Costa begins with an examination of burden of proof, 
describes the two different methods of proof in discrimina-
tion cases, clarifies how these two methods of proof have 
developed, and sets forth the employer’s options in discrimi-
nation cases. 
Understanding the Burden of Proof
To understand the two different methods for proving 
discrimination, it is necessary to explain how burdens of 
proof work. When a case reaches the trial stage, one party 
1 Desert Palace d/b/a Caesars Palace Hotel & Casino v. Costa, 123 S. Ct. 
2148 (2003).
bears the burden of proof, and therefore must convince the 
factfinder that its position is correct. In contrast, the other 
side need not prove anything. As a result, the primary task 
of the party without the burden is to prevent the other side 
from proving its argument. To better understand the concept 
of burden of proof, imagine a football field. The job of the 
offense is to score and the defense’s job is to prevent the 
offense from scoring. In a legal context, the side with the 
burden of proof is the offense, with the other side being the 
defense. While it would be nice for the defense to score, it 
does not have to. Similarly, while it would be nice for the 
litigant without the burden of proof to prove its case, it does 
not have to. It simply must prevent the other side from meet-
ing its burden 
Depending on the type of litigation, the party with the 
burden of proof will face one of three standards of proof. 
Those are (1) preponderance of the evidence, (2) clear and 
convincing evidence, and (3) beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Continuing the football analogy, to satisfy the preponder-
ance standard, the “offense” must get the ball past the fifty-
yard line into the other team’s territory. The clear and con-
vincing standard requires the ball to within easy field-goal 
range near the goal line. Last, establishing a case beyond a 
reasonable doubt is comparable to a touchdown, in that the 
factfinder must be almost certain of the facts being adduced. 
An effective way to explain the operation of the burden 
is to look at one of more famous criminal cases of the 20th 
century: People of California v. O.J. Simpson. In Simpson, as 
in all criminal cases, the prosecution carried the burden 
of proving “beyond a reasonable doubt” that Simpson was 
guilty of murder. The defense, on the other hand, was not 
required to prove anything. For instance, Simpson needed 
neither to prove that he did not kill the victims nor did 
he need to prove that someone else did. Rather, Simpson 
simply had to prevent the prosecution from successfully 
proving its case by attacking the prosecution’s assertions. For 
example, the prosecution presented blood from the crime 
scene, claiming it belonged to Simpson. Instead of proving 
that the blood did not match his, however, Simpson merely 
presented evidence to show that the chain of custody was 
	 The	Center	for	Hospitality	Research	•	Cornell	University	
broken, and therefore the evidence was unreliable. When the 
prosecution presented bloody gloves, Simpson discredited 
this evidence by demonstrating that the gloves did not fit 
him. Again, Simpson only needed to attack the prosecution’s 
evidence; he never had to prove his innocence. 2
Why a Case’s Outcome May Depend on  
Burden of Proof
There are two methods for proving intentional employment 
discrimination: (1) the McDonnell Douglas method; and (2) 
the “mixed motive” method. Based on the circumstances of 
the case, the judge determines whether to classify a matter as 
being a “mixed motive” case. 
McDonnell Douglas: Burdening the Plaintiff 
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the Supreme Court set 
forth a standard of proving discrimination in which the bur-
den of proof remained with the plaintiff at all times. 3 Under 
the McDonnell Douglas approach, plaintiffs must first prove 
a “prima facie case” by showing that they: (1) are members 
of a protected class; (2) were minimally qualified and either 
applied for or held the job; (3) suffered an adverse employ-
ment action; and (4) either the job remained open, was filled 
by someone outside the class, or similarly situated employ-
ees outside the protected class engaged in similar conduct 
and did not suffer the same adverse action. Plaintiffs that 
prove these four elements, which typically are not difficult 
to establish, create a presumption of discrimination. The 
defendant must then rebut this presumption.
In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 
the Supreme Court “clarified” how employers may rebut the 
presumption created when the plaintiff proves a prima facie 
case.4 Burdine held that the employer does not have to prove 
that it hired the best applicant or that it did not discriminate. 
Instead, the employer only has the burden of “articulating” 
2 In contrast, Simpson was found liable for wrongful death in a civil case 
where the standard was preponderance of the evidence.
3 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 793 (1973).
4 Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 
(1981).
a non-discriminatory reason for the employment deci-
sion. This requirement is not, however, a burden of proof. 
Instead, the employer’s burden is merely one of production. 
The employer must set forth the reason for its decision, but 
need not prove that the reason given is true. If the employer 
indeed satisfies its burden of production, the employee, ac-
cording to Burdine, could then take further steps to prove 
discrimination in one of two ways. First, the plaintiff can 
prevail by demonstrating that the real reason for the deci-
sion was discrimination (notwithstanding the reason given 
by the employer). Alternatively, the plaintiff could prevail 
by proving that the reason articulated by the employer was 
pretext (unworthy of belief). In either situation, the plaintiff, 
according Burdine, would prevail as a matter of law.
Mixed Motive: The Burden Begins to Shift
Seven years after Burdine, in Price-Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 
the Supreme Court developed a second method for proving 
intentional discrimination. 5 This method is referred to as 
the “mixed motive” method. In Hopkins, the plaintiff alleged 
she was denied partnership at Price-Waterhouse because 
she was a woman. To prove her case, the plaintiff presented 
evidence that partners made a number of discriminatory 
comments to her, including statements that she: (1) “was 
too masculine”; (2) “should wear more make-up”; and (3) 
“should go to charm school.” The Court held that basing 
employment decisions on a failure to live up to a sexual ste-
reotype constituted discrimination. Accordingly, the plaintiff 
would prevail if the employer relied on these discriminatory 
reasons for denying Hopkins partnership. The employer did 
not deny the alleged discriminatory reasons, but presented 
additional reasons for the decision not to promote the plain-
tiff. For example, the employer presented evidence that the 
plaintiff was disliked by staff members and had difficulty get-
ting along with colleagues. In addition, the employer argued 
that it previously denied partnership to male employees with 
deficiencies similar to those of the plaintiff.
The Hopkins Court was presented with a peculiar set 
of circumstances. Because there were both legitimate and 
5 Price-Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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illegitimate reasons for the employer’s decision, the Court 
held that the McDonnell-Douglas method was not appropri-
ate for resolving the case. In a hotly contested split decision, 
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion, which most courts 
accept as the case’s holding, set forth a new standard of 
proof for so-called “mixed motive” cases. Under O’Connor’s 
opinion, the mixed motive standard of proof requires an 
employee to prove by “direct evidence” that the protected 
characteristic, such as sex, was a substantial factor in the 
employer’s decision-making process. If the employee fails to 
meet this burden, the case is over. If, however, the employee 
satisfies the substantial factor test, the burden of proof shifts 
to the employer, which now has to prove (rather than merely 
assert) that it would have made the same decision regardless 
of the employee’s protected characteristic. An employer who 
meets this burden avoids liability and precludes the plaintiff 
from receiving an award. Conversely, if the employer fails 
to prove it would have made the same decision regardless of 
the protected characteristic, the plaintiff receives back pay, 
reinstatement, attorney’s fees, and litigation costs. 
O’Connor’s opinion emphasized that the mixed motive 
instruction was only available when the employee had direct 
evidence of discrimination. Examples of direct evidence 
include statements, documents, or other tangible examples 
of discrimination. Alternatively, circumstantial evidence, 
which consists of facts put together to create an inference of 
discrimination, did not entitle a plaintiff to a mixed motive 
method of proof. 
How Hicks Confused Matters
With its shifting burdens of proof, Hopkins created a model 
that was easy to follow. Employees with direct evidence of 
discrimination could argue their case was a “mixed motive” 
case and shift the burden of proof onto the employer. On the 
other hand, if there was no direct evidence of discrimination, 
plaintiffs would be required to prevail under the McDonnell 
Douglas formula. This “nice and neat” model lost some of 
its appeal after the Supreme Court decided St. Mary’s Honor 
Center v. Hicks. 6
6 St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
In Hicks, the plaintiff proved that the employer’s stated 
reason for terminating the employee was a pretext. The 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that proving 
pretext entitled the plaintiff to a judgment as a matter of law. 
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the Eight Circuit and 
held that while factfinders may infer discrimination from 
a finding of pretext, plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law only if they prove both that an employer’s 
articulated reason was a pretext and also that the real reason 
for the decision was discrimination. Commentators refer 
to this standard as “pretext plus evidence,” or, more simply, 
“pretext plus.” Not surprisingly, plaintiffs’ advocates were out-
raged by this holding, while those representing management 
were delighted by the decisions. 7 
Although a discussion of the merits of Hicks is beyond 
the scope of this report, its effect on discrimination litigation 
is profound and must be addressed. Before Hicks, the two 
different burdens of proof created a simple coherent model. 
Employees with no direct evidence of discrimination used 
the McDonnell Douglas formula and employees with direct 
evidence asked the court to consider the case to be mixed 
motive. After Hicks, cases without evidence were considered 
“orphan” cases.8 Plaintiffs’ lawyers did not want to invest 
years of time and money into a case that required a fact-
finder to infer discrimination. Instead, it made more sense to 
take on only those cases with actual evidence.9 If there was 
direct evidence, plaintiffs’ lawyers would contend that they 
were entitled to a mixed-motive instruction. Still, a model 
did survive: direct evidence involved St. Mary’s v. Hicks, 
while circumstantial evidence invoked McDonnell Douglas.
7 In many ways Hicks makes sense, because employer should be found 
guilty of discrimination only when the factfinders believe that the 
employer actually discriminated against the employee. Title VII is not a 
truth-in-employment act, and there are times when employers, despite 
their best efforts, may not know why a decision was made. 
8 See: Samuel Estreicher, “Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate 
over Pre-dispute Employment Arbitration Agreements,” 16 Ohio St. J. on 
Disp. Resol., 559 (2001).
9 Id.
A series of Supreme Court 
holdings and federal legislation 
have gradually shifted the 
burden of proof in employment 
discrimination cases.
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Civil Rights Act of 1991: More Complications 
While the formulas of proof were important, their real effect 
was limited for the following two reasons. First, Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (CRA) did not permit jury 
trials.10 Second, under Hopkins employers could prevail in 
mixed motive cases by proving they would have made the 
same decision regardless of the plaintiff ’s being part of a 
protected class. Accordingly, even though the mixed motive 
method redirected the burden of proof, employers could 
still prevail if they were able to convince the judge that they 
had not discriminated. The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 
1991 drastically changed the mixed motive landscape by: (1) 
allowing jury trials in Title VII cases,11 and (2) changing the 
standards and damage scheme for mixed motive cases. 
Before jury trials were permitted in Title VII cases, 
judges were the factfinders in cases relating to discrimina-
tion by race, sex, color, religion, and national origin. In many 
of these cases, the plaintiffs’ lawyers would argue that the 
case was a mixed motive case and the employer would argue 
it was not. A judge who was unsure whether the case war-
ranted applying the mixed motive method could appease the 
plaintiff and prevent a successful appeal by labeling the case 
“mixed motive” but then holding that the employer satisfied 
its burden. 
Charging the jury. After the CRA of 1991, however, 
the question of whether a case warranted application of 
the mixed motive method had a profound effect on the 
matter of who would be the factfinder. From that point 
on, the judge’s decision regarding whether the case is to be 
decided according to the McDonnell Douglas rules or the 
mixed motive approach manifests itself in instructions to a 
jury. A judge who labels a case as being a mixed motive case 
must instruct the jury that the employer must prove that it 
did not discriminate. Because of the difficulty of proving a 
negative, whether the judge instructs the jury with a mixed 
10 In contrast, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 
(ADEA) always allowed for jury trials.
11 Subsequent to the 1991 Act, Congress passed the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act, which also allowed for jury trials.
motive standard rather than a McDonnell Douglas standard 
may determine the result of the case. Placing the burden of 
proof on employers leads one to believe that employers will 
find it difficult—perhaps impossible—to prevail in mixed 
motive cases, especially given the perception that juries favor 
employees over employers.12
To make matters worse for employers, the CRA of 1991 
made the mixed motive instruction more “plaintiff friendly” 
in the following two essential ways. First, the statute made 
it easier for a plaintiff to obtain the judge’s determination 
that the case involved a mixed motive. Under CRA of 1991 
plaintiffs no longer have to prove that the protected charac-
teristic was a substantial factor in the employer’s decision. 
Instead, the new standard is that the protected characteristic 
be a “motivating factor” in the employment decision, which 
is an easier test to satisfy.
Second, the act changed the damage scheme to the 
point where litigating these cases becomes foolish for em-
ployers. We make this conclusion because judges can now 
award attorney fees, litigation costs, and declaratory judg-
ments to plaintiffs who met the “motivating factor” standard, 
even where the employer meets its burden of proving that 
the decision would have been made anyway. Thus, employ-
ers who successfully prove that the business decision would 
have been made regardless of discrimination are still subject 
to huge expenses and damages.
The effect of awarding costs and fees is profound 
because they are the major damage component of most dis-
crimination cases. In large cities like New York and Chicago, 
management lawyers report that their fees for a discrimi-
nation case will almost always exceed $150,000 and have 
often been well over $500,000.13 While plaintiffs’ lawyers’ 
fees awards are almost always less than management’s fees, 
they are still considerable. After the CRA of 1991, mixed 
motive cases became costly because employers who “won” 
12 David Sherwyn, J. Bruce Tracey, and Zev J. Eigen, “In Defense of 
Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing 
out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the Process,” 2 U. Pa. 
J. Lab. & Emp. L. 73.
13 Id.
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still might have to pay their attorneys’ fees and often the 
plaintiff ’s fees. Accordingly, it could easily cost an employer 
over $500,000 to “win” a mixed motive case. This figure does 
not include out-of-pocket litigation expenses for each side, 
lost employee and management time, and the bad publicity 
that accompanies both the trial and subsequent judgment of 
discrimination. As a result, after 1991 employers were well 
advised to settle mixed motive cases, because the costs of 
“winning” would almost always greatly exceed the settlement 
demand. 
The solace for employers was that mixed motive instruc-
tions were relatively unusual. The majority of jurisdictions 
held that a mixed motive instruction would only be given in 
cases with direct evidence of discrimination, which is hard 
to come by. Indeed, decision makers rarely make discrimina-
tory remarks in writing or in front of employees who might 
testify against the company. Thus, the mixed motive instruc-
tion was unavailable in the most discrimination cases.
How Costa Redefined the Landscape
Returning to the case originally known as Costa v. Desert 
Palace, the Ninth Circuit diverged from other circuits by 
holding that either direct or circumstantial evidence was 
sufficient to warrant a mixed motive instruction. To resolve 
the split among the circuits, the Supreme Court agreed to 
hear the case, issuing its decision in 2003, as Desert Palace 
d/b/a Caesars Palace Hotel & Casino v. Costa.14 The issue in 
Costa was whether direct evidence of discrimination was 
required for a plaintiff to receive a mixed motive instruction 
or whether circumstantial evidence would suffice. 
In arguing for direct evidence, the employer in Costa 
contended that Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in 
Hopkins, which required direct evidence, was the holding 
of the case and still the law. The plaintiff, on the other hand, 
argued the CRA of 1991’s language was clear and did not 
require any specific type of evidence. Rather, it merely stated 
that the plaintiff had to prove that discrimination motivated 
the employer. 
14 Supra.
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the CRA 
of 1991’s language was unambiguous and did not require 
direct evidence. Thus, any type of evidence of discrimination 
may enable a plaintiff to receive a mixed motive instruction. 
This decision could change the face of discrimination law 
because a plaintiff with any evidence of discrimination can 
now receive a mixed motive jury instruction, which, as we 
said above, may be tantamount to winning the case.
The Mixed Motive Instruction versus the  
Pretext Instruction
To clarify this distinction, let’s compare a sample mixed mo-
tive instruction with a typical pretext instruction. Each court 
may fashion its own specific jury instructions, as long as 
they are in accordance with settled law. Some jurisdictions, 
however, established model jury instructions that are used in 
the most cases. These instructions are accompanied by what 
are referred to as “special jury verdict sheets.” With that ca-
veat, the sidebar on the next page gives sample instructions 
from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit and sample special verdict sheets.
The difference between the two instructions may seem 
minimal and meaningless, but the difference is large when 
one considers the contention made several years ago by film 
director Spike Lee, who stated that race motivates a part of 
every decision. Regardless of whether Lee was correct, it is 
possible that a substantial number of potential jurors agree 
with him. It is also possible that there are those who feel the 
same way about sex, color, national origin, religion, age, and 
disability. Lee’s contention is important because anyone who 
subscribes to this theory will find that virtually any plaintiff 
in a discrimination case has satisfied the initial burden in 
the mixed motive scheme. The problem with that observa-
tion, however, is that after the CRA of 1991, the employee 
would receive costs and attorney fees based on that nothing 
more than that determination, even if the jury then decided 
that the employer’s decision would have been the same if 
race or other protect class were not involved. This situation 
infuriates management lawyers. Jurors do not know that 
their belief that discriminatory factors always motivate deci-
Language in the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991 allows a discrimination 
plaintiff to adduce any type of 
evidence—making it difficult for 
employers to defend themselves.
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A Comparison of Jury Instructions in a Failure-to-promote Case Based on National Origin
“pretext” instruction:
Plaintiff bases his lawsuit on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a law that makes it unlawful for an employer to 
discriminate against an employee on the basis of national origin. To succeed on this claim, Plaintiff must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he was denied a promotion by Defendant because of his national origin.* To determine 
that Plaintiff was denied a promotion because of his national origin, you must decide that Defendant would have promoted 
Plaintiff had he not been of his particular national origin but everything else was the same. 
If you find that Plaintiff has proved by a preponderance of the evidence each of the things required of him, then you must 
find for Plaintiff. However, if you find that Plaintiff did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence each of the things 
required of him, then you must find for Defendant. 
“mixed motive” instruction:
Plaintiff bases his lawsuit on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a law that makes it unlawful for an employer to 
discriminate against an employee on the basis of national origin. To succeed on this claim, Plaintiff must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that his national origin was a motivating factor in Defendant’s decision not to offer him a 
promotion. A motivating factor is something that contributed to Defendant’s decision. 
If you find that Plaintiff has proved that his national origin contributed to Defendant’s decision not to offer him a promotion, 
you must then decide whether Defendant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have not offered him a 
promotion even if Plaintiff was not of his particular national origin. If you find that the Defendant has proven that it would 
not have offered him a promotion even in the absence of discrimination, you must still enter a verdict for the Plaintiff but 
you may not award him damages. 
special verdict sheets:
pretext Cases: 
1. Did plaintiff establish by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant discriminated against him in violation of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on the basis of his national origin with respect to the decision not to offer him 
a promotion in December 2003?
Yes ____ No ____
If you answered “no” to Question 1, sign the special verdict form on the last page. If you answered “yes” to Question 1, 
plaintiff is entitled to recover back pay damages. The parties have stipulated that the total amount of back pay to be 
awarded to plaintiff is $50,000. Check the box below to signify that the plaintiff is entitled to damages of $50,000 
and then sign the special verdict form. 
mixed motive Cases:
1. Did plaintiff establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his national origin was a motivating factor in the 
decision by defendant not to offer him a promotion in December 2003? 
Yes ____ No ____
You should answer the next question only if you answered “yes” to Question 1. If you answered Question 1 “no,” you 
should not answer any further questions but sign this special verdict form on the last page and return the form to 
the clerk. 
2. Did defendant establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant would have treated plaintiff the 
same way even if the plaintiff’s national origin had not played any role in the employment decision? 
Yes ____ No ____ 
If you answered “yes” to Question 2, sign the special verdict form on the last page. If you answered “no” to Question 2, 
plaintiff is entitled to recover back pay damages. The parties have stipulated that the total amount of back pay to be 
awarded to plaintiff is $50,000. Check the box below to signify that the plaintiff is entitled to damages of $50,000 
and then sign the special verdict form. 
 * Our example involves national origin, but it could be any of the other six protected classes: namely, sex, race, color, religion, age, or disability.
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sions, means that they will unwittingly award the plaintiff 
costs and fees, regardless of the employer’s intentions.
One “Management Lawyer’s” Method for 
Avoiding the Unintended Fees
Considering this two-part test, coauthor Joe Baumgarten, of 
the law firm of Proskauer, Rose, raised another concern. He 
hypothesized that to suit their sense of “fair play,” juries that 
are presented with a two-prong decision would “split the 
baby,” as follows. They first would hold that the protected 
class motivated the employer. Then they would determine 
that the employer would have made the same decision 
regardless of the protected class. Once again, such a jury 
would have no idea that it had just awarded costs and fees to 
the plaintiff. Baumgarten sought to eliminate this problem 
by taking the issues in stepwise fashion. Rather than offer 
both prongs of the mixed-motive instruction, Baumgarten 
suggests simply having the jury determine whether the 
protected class motivated the employer’s decision. He argues 
that a jury might be less inclined to find such motivation 
if that is the only question asked and if they knew that the 
finding of “yes” meant that the employer had to pay damages. 
Because the second prong involves an employer’s defense, 
the employer can determine in advance whether to present 
it. Thus, Baumgarten proposed a third set of instructions 
and special jury verdict sheet. In this instruction he elimi-
nated the second prong of the mixed motive instruction and 
the second question on the special verdict sheet. Thus, the 
instruction and the verdict sheet would appear as shown in 
the accompanying box.
What Does This All Mean for Employers?
Although courts are still divided on whether the pretext 
jury instruction is dead, it is clear that after Costa, more and 
more cases will receive mixed motive instructions. Conse-
quently, employers need to know how to deal with this situ-
ation. Beyond that, we must examine whether the judge’s in-
structions to the jury matter or whether certain language in 
the instructions has led to cases’ being settled for as amount 
great than might otherwise occur. Then there’s the question 
we raised at the beginning of this report, of whether em-
ployers should forget litigation and settle all mixed motive 
cases. If not, should employers use the Baumgarten rule and 
eliminate the second prong? 
None of these issues can be resolved definitively, due 
to the pervasive problems associated with trying to use 
testing techniques common in social science to answer legal 
questions, as well as certain problems that are specific to the 
matter of jury instructions. Whenever legal scholars seek 
to answer questions using research methods from social 
science they battle a number of issues. First, not all cases are 
reported and those that are reported do not reflect a random 
Alternative Jury Instruction
mixed motive instruction without the “second prong”
Plaintiff bases his lawsuit on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, a law that makes it unlawful for an employer to 
discriminate against an employee on the basis of national 
origin. To succeed on this claim, Plaintiff must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that his national origin was 
a motivating factor in Defendant’s decision not to offer 
him a promotion. A motivating factor is something that 
contributed to Defendant’s decision. 
If you find that Plaintiff has proved that his national origin 
contributed to Defendant’s decision not to offer him a 
promotion, you must enter a verdict for the Plaintiff, even 
if you believe that there were other motivating factors that 
would have caused the Defendant not to offer him a 
promotion even in the absence of any discriminatory 
motivation. 
special verdict sheet without the second Question
1.   Did plaintiff establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that his national origin was a motivating 
factor in the decision by defendant not to offer him a 
promotion in December 2003? 
Yes ____ No ____
If you answered “yes” to Question 1, plaintiff is entitled 
to recover back pay damages. The parties have 
stipulated that the total amount of back pay to be 
awarded to plaintiff is $50,000. Check the box below 
to signify that the plaintiff is entitled to damages of 
$50,000 and then sign the special verdict form. 
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sample. Second, even if all cases were reported there is still 
a problem when trying to draw specific conclusions from 
different cases with different sets of facts and different issues 
of law.
The issues we discussed here face even more problems 
than those related to sampling and idiosyncrasy. First, most 
settlements are confidential, making it essentially impossible 
to measure the effect of Costa on settlement size. Second, 
while a large number of discrimination opinions are pub-
lished, the results of jury trials are not the issues that make 
it into the court reports. Instead, most of the reported cases 
feature the judges’ opinions on summary judgment motions 
(which occur before the case goes to a jury) and appeals. The 
appeals cases are only relevant if the type of jury instruction 
is the issue being examined (a small percentage of appeals). 
Finally, looking at the results of jury trials is not helpful 
because the jury instructions are often not available so it 
is often impossible to know whether the case was a mixed 
motive case.
Experimental Testing Methodology
Since no data are available to answer the questions we have 
sought to address here, we conducted an experiment. Like 
many large law firms, Proskauer occasionally tests a case on 
a mock jury before the case goes to trial. Because of the cost 
of a full mock trial, however, Baumgarten and his team of 
lawyers sometimes test their case by having the mock jury 
hear a statement of the case only, rather than mock testi-
mony or other evidence. Proskauer refers to these statements, 
which are combinations of an opening statement and closing 
argument, as “clopenings.” Armed with the clopenings from 
the plaintiff and the defense on a sample case, we were able 
to conduct our experiment. 
First, Proskauer videotaped two of its lawyers deliver-
ing the clopenings. Next, Proskauer videotaped Baumgarten 
delivering the following three different jury instructions: 
(1) pretext instructions; (2) the two-prong mixed motive 
instruction, with the affirmative defense; and (3) the single-
prong mixed motive instruction, without the affirmative de-
fense (shown in the sidebar on the preceding page). Armed 
with the tapes, we had to then find potential jurors. Unfor-
tunately, the same people who will happily watch a “Law and 
Order” marathon are reluctant to take part in a law-related 
study. Thus, we asked students attending Cornell University 
to be our mock court jurors.
Study Design
We designed our controlled study as follows. On three 
separate nights, we had between 50 and 100 students sit in a 
particular auditorium and watch the clopenings, for a total 
of 219 students. We then randomly assigned each student to 
one of three roughly equal groups, each of which heard one 
of the test jury instructions. One group of 76 students was 
Exhibit 1
mixed motive (mm) versus pretext (p) Decisions
  
Not promoted because of  
national origin or national  
origin not a motivating  
factor
No Count 42 57 99 
 Expected Count 52.3 46.8 99.0
Yes Count 34 11 45 
 Expected Count 23.8 21.3 45.0
Total Count 76 68 144 
 Expected Count 76.0 68.0 144.0
 
  Asymp.sig.
 value (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square* 13.626* .01
w/ Continuity Correction* 12.329 .01
Likelihood Ratio 14.167 .01
Linear-by-Linear Association 13.531 .01  
Notes: Pearson Chi-Square and continuity correction are 
computed only for a 2x2 table; N of valid cases = 144.
Exhiibit 1a 
mixed motive with Affirm Defense (mm w/AD) versus 
pretext (p) Decisions
 
Not promoted  
because of national origin 
No Count 70 57 127 
 Expected Count 67.0 60.0 127.0
Yes Count 6 11 17 
 Expected Count 9.0 8.0 17.0
Total Count 76 68 144 
 Expected Count 76.0 68.0 144.0
  Asymp.sig.
 value (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square* 2.364* .124
w/ Continuity Correction* 1.636 .201
Likelihood Ratio 2.381 .123
Linear-by-Linear Association 2.348 .125  
Notes: Pearson Chi-Square and continuity correction are 
computed only for a 2x2 table; N of valid cases = 144.
 Group  
 mm p total
 Group  
 mm w AD p total
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labeled MM, for mixed motive (the full, two-prong test); a 
second group of 75 students was called MMWO, for mixed 
motive without the affirmative defense (the single-prong 
idea); and the third, comprising 68 participants, was group P, 
for pretext. After hearing the jury instructions, each student 
received and filled out the designated jury verdict sheet. 
Like actual jurors, the MM students did not know that if 
they answered yes to question 1 and yes to question 2 they 
were awarding costs and fees. Again like actual juries, the 
MMWO and the P students, on the other hand, knew that 
they were awarding all or nothing based on their answer to 
the one question on their verdict sheet.
The results were remarkable. Before we discuss those 
results, however, we must add the caveat that we make no 
claim that our sample is representative of the juror pool at 
large. First, our pool of 18- to 22-year-olds is substantially 
younger than normal jury pools. Second, we like to believe 
Cornell students are well above average in terms of intel-
ligence and education. Finally, most participants were stu-
dents at the Cornell University School of Hotel Administra-
tion, who would undoubtedly be biased toward management 
when it comes to employment disputes. Even acknowledging 
these problems, we believe that the experiment has merit. 
While our 219 students may not be representative of typical 
pool, they are, in fact, potential jurors.
Study Results
Despite the fact that our sample is clearly skewed in the ways 
we just described, we found that jury instructions strongly 
influenced the outcome for our particular sample. The raw 
numbers show that a disparity did seem to exist between 
the findings of the different groups. Jurors found for the 
plaintiff and awarded damages in twenty-two of the MMWO 
cases (29%) and eleven of the pretext (P) cases (16%). The 
mixed motive instruction is more complicated, as the two 
prongs can lead to the following three different results: (1) 
no damages; (2) costs and attorneys’ fees; or (3) full dam-
ages. This group of students awarded either costs and fees or 
full damages in thirty-four of the MM cases (45%); that is, 
they awarded only costs and fees in twenty-eight of the cases 
(37%), and full damages in six of the cases (8%). A quick 
look at these raw numbers leads one to believe that employ-
ers are better off with a pretext instruction than either of the 
mixed motive instructions and, depending on the amount of 
damages and costs and fees, better off with the single-prong 
mixed motive instruction (MMWO). These raw numbers 
are not, however, indicative of statistical significance and it 
is possible that the differences are just a matter of chance. To 
get a full and clear picture of the connection between jury 
instructions and the awarding of damages we conducted a 
statistical analysis of the data by analyzing each set of deci-
sions against each other.
Mixed Motive versus Pretext Decisions
We began by testing whether there are differences in the 
jury’s decision when we compare the first prong of the mixed 
motive (MM1) against the one-prong pretext instruction 
(P). Specifically, we wanted to learn whether the number of 
mixed motive jurors (34) who found that national origin did 
motivate the employer, was significantly different than the 
number of pretext jurors (11) who found that the employer 
was liable. As can be seen from the results in Exhibit 1 this 
differential was highly significant, at the 99-percent level 
of confidence.15 In other words whether the mock jury was 
given a pretext instruction or mixed motive instruction 
produced a significant difference across the groups as to the 
finding of the first prong of the mixed motive instruction 
versus the pretext instruction. 
Next, we compared the entire mixed motive instruc-
tion—comprising both prong one and prong two (MM2)—
against the pretext instruction. Specifically, we wanted to 
find whether there was a significant difference between the 
six (of the 76) mixed motive jurors who found that the em-
ployer would have acted in the same manner regardless of 
national origin versus the 11 (out of 68) pretext jurors who 
found for the company. Using the same statistical tests, we 
found no significance between the full mixed motive finding 
and the pretext finding. Thus, before the law changed in 1991 
we could argue that whether the judge used a pretext in-
struction or a mixed motive instruction was irrelevant. The 
change in the law, however, means that while the ultimate 
finding is insignificant, the costs and fees component (prong 
one) is significant.
Mixed Motive Without (MMWO) versus  
Pretext Decisions (P)
The next question we examined was whether the results of 
a pretext (P) instruction question differed from the results 
of the mixed motive instruction without the second prong 
(MMWO). The raw numbers were as follows: 11 of the 
jurors (16%) found for the plaintiff in the P cases, and 22 of 
the jurors (29%) found for the plaintiff the MMWO cases. 
The results of this analysis are seen in Exhibit 2 (overleaf). 
As in the last comparison we estimated both the pair-wise 
comparison chi -square tests and the likelihood ratio and 
linear-by-linear test to determine the pair-wise and individ-
ual group differences. The results show that this differential 
was found to be marginally significant. Specifically, we found 
the difference between the MMWO and P group to be signif-
15 We first ran a Pearson chi-square test (with and without a continuity 
correction) to determine whether there are differences in the attribution 
of motivation across the two instruction sets. We then ran both likelihood 
ratio and linear-by-linear association tests to determine whether this dif-
ference was statistically significant.
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icant at the 90-percent level of confidence. This means that it 
is unlikely that this differential is due to chance, although an 
outcome by mere chance is possible. Thus, employers faced 
with a mixed motive instruction and who choose not to have 
the second prong will, all other things being equal, likely 
have a more difficult time prevailing under this instruction 
than they would under the pretext instruction. 
Mixed Motive (MM) versus Mixed Motive 
Without (MMWO)
We also looked at how jurors answered the prong-one ques-
tion in the two different instructions. Remember, question 
one is same in both instructions. The only difference is that 
the MM group faces a second question that is thought to 
affect the outcome. Here we are assessing the likelihood of a 
different decision for the two groups simply because the MM 
group has an option created by the existence of the prong-
two question that the MMWO group never sees. MM jurors 
answered yes (discrimination motivated the employer) in 
44 percent of the cases, while MMWO answered yes in 29 
percent of the cases. As in the last comparison we estimated 
both the pair-wise comparison chi-square tests and the 
likelihood ratio and linear-by-linear test to determine the 
pair-wise and individual group differences. As can be seen 
from the results in Exhibit 3 this differential was also found 
to be marginally significant. Thus, the MM1 and MMWO 
groups made different decisions with a 90-percent level of 
confidence. Based on this finding, employers who are faced 
with low back pay, but high costs and fees should definitely 
think about limiting the mixed motive instruction to one 
prong, as suggested by author Baumgarten. 
The final question we looked at is whether the MMWO 
jurors will provide a different final result than the MM jurors 
once the MM jurors hear both prongs. Based on the earlier 
data discussion we know that for full liability MMWO found 
for the plaintiff in 29 percent of the cases and MM2 jurors 
found for the plaintiff in 7 percent of the cases. Once again 
using the statistical tests, as shown in Exhibit 4, this differ-
ence was found to be highly significant. These results now 
provide a clear indication that the presence of the second 
prong in the jury’s instruction will produce significantly dif-
ferent decisions, compared to an instruction that offers only 
prong one. The inclusion of the second prong in the jury 
instructions will likely have a significant and positive impact 
Exhibit 3
mixed motive (mm) versus mixed motive Without 
(mmWo) Decisions
  
prong-one question is 
the only decision for 
both mm and mmWo
No Count 42 53 95 
 Expected Count 47.8 47.2 95.0
Yes Count 34 22 56 
 Expected Count 28.2 27.8 56.0
Total Count 76 75 151 
 Expected Count 76.0 75.0 151.0
 
  Asymp.sig.
 value (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square* 13.626* .050
w/ Continuity Correction* 3.207 .073
Likelihood Ratio 3.861 .049
Linear-by-Linear Association 3.813 .051  
Notes: Pearson Chi-Square and continuity correction are 
computed only for a 2x2 table; N of valid cases = 151; No 
cells have an expected count less than 5; the minimum 
expected count is 27.81.
 Group  
 mm mmWo total
Exhiibit 2
mixed motive Without (mmWo) versus pretext (p) 
Decisions
 
Not promoted because  
of national origin or  
national origin not a  
motivating factor
No Count 53 57 110 
 Expected Count 57.7 52.3 110.0
Yes Count 22 11 33 
 Expected Count 17.3 15.7 33.0
Total Count 75 68 143 
 Expected Count 75.0 68.0 143.0
 
  Asymp.sig.
 value (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square* 3.478* .062
w/ Continuity Correction* 2.776 .096
Likelihood Ratio 3.540 .060
Linear-by-Linear Association 3.453 .063  
Notes: Pearson Chi-Square and continuity correction are 
computed only for a 2x2 table; N of valid cases = 143
 Group  
 mmWo p total
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on the decision from the employer’s perspective. Based on 
this finding, employers faced with a large amount of back 
pay should include the second prong of the mixed motive 
instruction. 
Conclusion 
Our results point strongly to the principle that the legal 
theories contained in jury instructions matter. Assuming 
facts that could go either way, employers have a substantially 
equal chance of prevailing in pretext and mixed motive cases, 
but there is significant chance that a mixed motive instruc-
tion will result in cost and fees being awarded. Employers 
therefore are better off with a pretext instruction than a 
mixed motive instruction. If, however, the judge orders a 
mixed motive instruction, the employer has a difficult choice. 
The MMWO instruction will more likely yield a complete 
victory for the plaintiff than will the MM. On the other hand, 
the chance of the full mixed motive instruction resulting 
in an award of costs and fees is greater than the likelihood 
of the one-prong mixed motive instruction, resulting in a 
complete plaintiff victory. The question that arises is whether 
the employer should offer the second-prong defense if the 
judge orders a mixed motive instruction. We believe that the 
answer depends on the case. If the case is a “fees case” (low 
liability, but high attorneys fees),16 the employer should go 
with the one-prong MMWO. If liability is high, the employer 
should stick with the full two-prong mixed motive. Both of 
these options, however, are worse than pretext instruction.
The CRA of 1991 made the mixed motive instruction 
much more detrimental to employers. Costa made the mixed 
motive instruction much easier to obtain. As plaintiffs’ law-
yers become more familiar with the mixed motive instruc-
tion they will request it more often. Employers should argue 
against that approach, but if the judge orders it, employers 
then need to assess the true costs of their case. It is a fees 
case our study suggest employer should use the MMWO. In 
a case where the potential for substantial back pay is high 
employers should present the full two-prong mixed motive 
defense.  n
16 Sometimes back pay is marginal because the employee found another 
job, but the litigation costs may be hundreds of thousands of dollars. 
Other times, both the back pay and the fees are high. It is rare for a case to 
involve high back pay and low fees. 
Exhibit 4
mixed motive (mm) versus mixed motive Without 
(mmWo) Decisions
  
prong-one decision on 
both and prong-two
decision for mm only
No Count 70 53 123 
 Expected Count 61.9 61.1 123.0
Yes Count 6 22 28 
 Expected Count 14.1 13.9 28.0
Total Count 76 75 151 
 Expected Count 76.0 75.0 151.0
 
  Asymp.sig.
 value (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square* 11.486* .01
w/ Continuity Correction* 10.111 .01
Likelihood Ratio 12.070 .01
Linear-by-Linear Association 11.410 .01  
Notes: Pearson Chi-Square and continuity correction are 
computed only for a 2x2 table; N of valid cases = 151.
 Group  
 mm mmWo total
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